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INTRODUCTION 
Vertical coordination in agrifood supply chains, often induced by foreign investment, plays an 
important role in overcoming market imperfections. In many developing and transition countries, 
farmers have difficulties accessing technology, inputs, credit to produce the commodities which 
processors and traders want to purchase. As a result, in many of these countries, processing, trading 
and input supplying companies have engaged in a variety of, sometimes quite unconventional, forms 
of contracting with farms (Swinnen, 2006). In many cases, processors introduced programs to improve 
farms’ access to inputs. For example, in Kenya, contract farming is widely practised, as input finance
is crucial for the production of many high value and export crops (Ruotsi, 2003). The same is found in
other African countries, e.g. in the cotton sector (Poulton et al., 2004). In the Philippines, Hendriks 
(1994) notes that wholesale traders provide credit to farmers for fertilizers, pesticides and seeds in
order to secure supply. According to Shepherd (2004), supplier assistance programs are a feature of 
most agricultural marketing systems in Asia, in order to secure supply, guarantee markets and reduce 
transaction costs.  
Effectively, what these companies do is a form of what is described in the development economics 
literature as “interlinking markets” (see e.g. Bardhan and Udry, 1999). A typical example of this 
traditional literature is a landlord in a developing country who uses his/her better access to credit to act 
as an intermediary between an outside loan market and his/her tenants, in addition to their “normal” 
interaction in the land market. Enforcement of the loans is possible because of the landlord’s dominant 
market position in the land relationship. Another example of this model is the trader-farmer 
relationship in distant villages. Here, the farmer is dependent on the trader for access to the output
markets, while the trader acts as a financial intermediary, allowing the farmer better access to credit. 
Here, enforcement of the credit transaction (loan and repayment) occurs through the output market. 
Similar interlinking is occurring in high-value commodity chains in many developing and transition 
countries where processors and retailers offer interlinked contracts to local producers. Interlinking 
markets can bring farm investment and production closer to optimal levels by circumventing 
imperfections in credit, input, and output markets. In fact, there is substantial empirical evidence that 
these contracts are having important positive effects on efficiency, productivity and investment (e.g.
Dries and Swinnen, 2004).  
However, in trying to understand the microfoundations of these new institutions, we should not be 
blind for their potentially adverse consequences. For example, the very nature of rationale for the 
emergence of these interlinked transactions may at the same time act as an important barrier to entry 
for other agents and may give the dominant partner in a transaction some additional leverage. As 
Bardhan and Udry (1999: 111) remark, “the thin line between understanding an institution and 
justifying it is often blurred, particular by careless interpreters of the theory.”  
The objective of this paper is (a) to analyze the equity and efficiency effects of interlinking in high-
value supply chains, and (b) to investigate what the impact of competition is on these effects. Section
2 of the paper presents a conceptual model of interlinking and competition, in order to identify the 
effects on equity and efficiency. Section 3 reviews some empirical evidence available, including our 
study of the Central Asian cotton supply chains. Section 4 suggests some observed institutional 
arrangements that can mitigate potential perverse effects of competition. The final section concludes.
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THEORY 
A Conceptual Framework of Efficiency and Equity with Interlinking 
To understand the relationship between equity and efficiency with interlinking markets, consider a 
contract between a supplying farm (F), with welfare represented by expected utility U
F, and a 
processing company (C), with expected utility U
C. Figure 1 illustrates the pre- and post-contracting 
welfare of the agents. Without interlinked contracts the utility possibility frontier is U0U0. Assume that 




0), represented by point A.  
By introducing an interlinked contract, farms can access credit, inputs, etc. which were unavailable 
before and companies can have access to higher quality and timely supplies. Total welfare increases 
and the utility possibility frontier shifts to U1U1. The question is who benefits from the welfare 
increase: both agents or only one? In other words, will the new equilibrium be at point W, B, or E? At
point E, both parties share in the gains from the institutional innovation, and everybody is better off. 
At point B, the processing firm extracts all the rents of the innovation. The answer critically depends 
on each party’s bargaining power within the contract. 
There are several models in the development economics literature explaining how one can arrive at 
point B. For example if company C has monopsony powers and can thus set the conditions of the 
contract, supplier F will accept the contract as long as it is as least as good as his outside option.
Hence, at the margin, it will be optimal for C to offer F a contract with conditions which provide F 
with an expected utility equal to U
F
0, F’s reservation utility or outside option. This is the case 
represented by point B. In output-credit market interlinkages (trader-farmer) C typically does this by
subsidizing credits (lower interest rates) and taxing outputs (lower output prices) (Bardhan and Udry,
1999).  
If F’s bargaining power increases relative to C’s, the relationship surplus may be shared more equally,
like in E. Genicot and Ray (2006) indicate that in contractual relationships two notions of power can 
be distinguished: the first is determined by the outside options, the second one occurs in markets with
frictions and involves a bilateral notion of power. Although we also take outside options into account, 
it is this second notion of power that we define as “bargaining power” in our model and which is 
denoted as β. This is clarified in Figure 2.  
In a Nash bargaining framework, utility will be distributed among the bargaining agents so as to 
maximize collective utility, subject to the prevailing participation constraints of both agents. The 
participation constraints are given by the agents’ respective outside options: in our case, the utility 
obtained by each in locus A. Every locus on and at the left of the vertical line through A yields F at
least his utility in A. In B, his participation constraint is binding. Every locus on and above the 
horizontal through A yields C at least its utility in A. In D, its participation constraint is binding.
The combined preferences of C and F are represented by the collective indifference curves. The 
weights of the utility of both agents in these collective preferences are determined by their bargaining 
power. Figure 2 shows that for preferences represented by the indifference curve I1I1 (and parallels), 
more weight is given to C’s utility than for those reflected by I2I2. This reflects that C’s bargaining 
power is higher in case of collective preferences I1I1 than in case of collective preferences I2I2.
Preferences represented by I2I2 result in a more equal utility distribution. Hence, the equilibrium 
position between B and D along the frontier is determined by the relative bargaining power.  
So far we have argued that the farmer can never be worse off with the contract. However, Bell (1988) 
shows how in a Nash bargaining framework a peasant may be worse off in dealing with a landlord 
with interlinked transactions than with separate bilateral bargains because the interlinking of 
transactions may actually bestow additional monopoly power upon C. Personalized and interlinked 
transactions can weaken the collective bargaining strengths of workers vis-à-vis employers (Bardhan, 
1989). In these cases, one may end up at point W, where F’s utility is actually lower after the contract 
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Hence, an important – and very much an outstanding – issue is how to obtain the efficiency gains 
without negative equity effects from these institutional innovations, and what role competition plays in 
this framework.  
Available empirical evidence indicates that in many developing and transition countries, positive 
equity effects seem to have occurred in many cases (Swinnen, 2006; World Bank, 2005). In transition 
countries, the collapse of farm output and livestock numbers created a gap between processing 
capacity and supply, and an excess demand based on processing capacity, especially for high quality. 
This makes it a “suppliers’ market” in most of Eastern Europe and Central Asia and this supports the 
farms’ bargaining position in the supply chain. Similarly, in many developing countries there is a 
shortage of quality supplies for processing and retail companies in high value chains (e.g. Codron et 
al., 2004). 
It is important to note that in this paper, we do not to analyze which types of suppliers are participating 
in interlinked contracts. There is an extensive debate on the likelihood of exclusion of small farmers in 
this process. This issue is addressed in another paper (see e.g. the paper by Maertens and Swinnen in 
this volume). The analysis in this paper focuses only on how the surplus that is created through 
interlinking is divided among the processors (traders, retailers, …) on the one hand and the farms 
(suppliers) on the other hand, and how competition affects this. 
The Role of Competition 
Intuitively, one would expect that competition on the demand side among processors and retailers 
plays an important role in the rent distribution. However, competition will not only affect the rent 
distribution (equity impact) but also the total amount of rents (efficiency). This is illustrated in Figure 
3. First, competition can have a positive equity effect by ensuring suppliers a larger share of the gains 
from an interlinked contract, as it prevents companies from exercising monopoly power in the setting 
of the contract conditions. As a result, one ends up somewhere to the right of B, say at point E.  
Second, competition can have a positive efficiency effect by inducing buyers to compete not only on 
prices, but also on services. As a result, if one processor decides to introduce a supplier assistance
program, this may induce (or force) other processors to do the same. This may lead to a further spread
of assistance programs among competing processors, inducing a shift from U1U1 to U2U2 and hence 
from E to H. 
Third, competition could also induce opportunistic behaviour of suppliers. A supplier may use the 
delivered inputs for other crops, not under contract, or sell them to another farmer. As a result, his
output will not comply with the agreed quality norms, and the supplier will have to sell his output to
another processor at the low-value market. Alternatively, the supplier could apply the delivered inputs 
according to the contracted processor’s indications but sell his output afterwards at a higher price to a 
competing processor. The competing processor may be able to offer a higher price since the 
contracting processor takes into account the cost of the delivered inputs in determining the producer’s 
price. If the supplier “side-sells” in this way, interlinking becomes a loss-making operation for the 
processor who provided the suppliers’ inputs, and this firm may have to close down its input program. 
Competition increases the likelihood of sideselling in two different ways. First of all, because the 
threat of cut-off from future credit arrangements is less stringent when there are other credit providers 
available (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1998); secondly because reputation effects are less prevalent in a 
competitive market where buyers are less likely to coordinated and share information. This will make 
it easier for the supplier to find an alternative buyer. Local information-sharing networks work less 
well when the number of agents expands, as it costs more effort, money and/or time to let information 
spread among a larger group of agents (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1998). As the penalty from contract breach 
becomes lighter, the incidence of sideselling will be higher. As a result, processing firms will cease
their input provision programs. 
The discontinuation of interlinking arrangements will have a negative efficiency effect, causing the 
utility possibility frontier to fall back from U2 to U0, where we end up in point G. This phenomenon is 
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interfirm competition, firms will invest less in their employees’ human capital, taking into account the 
risk that other firms might freeride, enticing the employees to work at their company after being 
trained.  
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE  
The literature provides case studies and evidence that support each of the arguments made above. 
Empirical evidence reveals that contract terms improve with more competition, but also that input and 
credit programs have collapsed because of (too much) competition and opportunistic behaviour by 
farmers. First, some studies show that more competition leads to a necessity for support programmes, 
and a concomitant willingness to provide them. Second, they show that competition increases the 
suppliers’ bargaining position, inducing a shift in producer prices or forcing buyers to provide more 
extensive farm support. Third, empirical evidence confirms that many input programs have collapsed 
due to competition.  
Competition improves contract terms for farmers  
First, there is considerable evidence that increased competition following price and trade liberalization 
increased prices for farmers in Asia and Africa. For example, in Tanzania, the parastatal monopoly of 
the Cotton Board was eliminated in 1994 (Baffes, 2004). As a result of the increasing competition in 
cotton marketing and ginning, suppliers received an average share of 51% of export prices compared 
with 41% before liberalization. In Zimbabwe, cotton producer prices improved as well when new 
companies entered the market: before liberalization, the average producer price was 42% of the world 
market price (Larsen, 2002). After liberalization, it reached 53% on average. However, there is a huge
year-to-year variability in producer prices. Liberalization boosted producer incentives in Zambia as 
well (Boughton et al. 2003). National cotton production peered from 20,000 tons to an average of 
80,000 tons. Over the period 1995-2000, Zambia paid the highest average producer price share of Sub-
Saharan Africa, amounting to 56% of the export price. Also in Pakistan, price liberalization, privatized 
export trade and the elimination of export restrictions and taxes have all contributed to higher prices 
and greater production incentives for cotton growers under interlinked arrangements (Smith et al.,
1999). Opportunities for rent extraction are minimized as farmers can shift easily between lenders, 
according to the price and quality of the services offered. 
Second, several studies report that competition leads to a higher bargaining power of the suppliers who
may threat to deliver to other buyers if no input or credit is extended to them. This is found to be the 
case in Africa, Latin-America, Asia, and in several transition countries (Fisman and Raturi, 2004; 
Conning, 2000; World Bank, 2005). In Zimbabwe, although price competition among cotton ginners is 
weak, ginners compete on the services they offer to farmers, more specifically with respect to input 
and credit provision (Larsen, 2002). In Eastern Europe, competition among dairy and sugar processors 
contributed to the spreading of farm assistance programs (Gow et al., 2000; World Bank, 2005). In the 
Pakistani cotton market, more competition amongst buyers has lead to a tighter supply market, and 
credit was the only way to ensure availability of supply (Smith et al. 1999). Also in Pakistan, 
Stockbridge et al. (1998) indicate that many sugar mills are working below capacity. In order to attract 
supplies, some mills are improving the terms and conditions they offer to farmers, including more 
attractive prices and easier access to credit. The converse has been observed with respect to cotton 
ginneries in the Mirpurkhas district of Pakistan. There, because of the good cotton crops achieved in 
recent years, ginneries have been operating at full capacity. As a consequence, many have ceased to 
provide credit to their suppliers, as competing for scarce cotton supplies is no longer necessary. 
It is also interesting to note that in the Zambian cotton sector, where after liberalization a high degree 
of concentration remained, smallholders receive credit packages of about US$43 each in the 
framework of interlinked contracts. Conversely, Mozambican (monopolistic) concession holding 
cotton companies use credit packages of only US$10-15 per hectare. Nevertheless, input prices are 
much higher in the latter country. At this low credit and input level, yields have remained low in 
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markets like Zambia already offer better contract terms to farmers than purely monopolistic markets 
like Mozambique.  
More evidence on how competition can improve contract terms for farmers, is revealed by a 
comparative study of the cotton sector in 4 Central Asian countries by Swinnen et al. (2006).  
In Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan, vertical coordination, including contracting 
and interlinking, is widespread in the cotton supply chains. Interlinking arrangements are used to 
overcome important constraints faced by farms, in particular access to credit, cotton seeds, and 
irrigation. However, the nature of the contracts and their effects on equity and efficiency differ 
dramatically among the countries. The reason is the different policies of the governments concerning 
privatization and, in particular, competition. In Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, where the government has 
allowed the private gins to develop and to compete, farms have benefited from the reforms and from 
vertical coordination, with strong competition, resulting in high prices and strong cotton growth (see
Table 1). On the other hand, in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, governments actively control (directly or 
indirectly) input supplies, production, processing and marketing in the cotton chain. Due to the 
absence of competition, vertical coordination is characterized by depressed prices and stagnating 
cotton production, and major rent extraction of cotton farms.  
Cotton exports are a major source of government revenue in Uzbekistan and the state has continued to 
impose strict controls on the cotton chain, including through government-controlled interlinking. 
Market reform has been slow. Nearly all gins remain under government ownership, and even the 
privately owned gins are subject to government control. Cotton farm financing is in practice only 
available through a single form of contracting offered by the state through the two main state banks. 
Inputs are provided through a centralized system of state controlled enterprises. The government re-
instituted a state monopoly on the purchase of cotton in 1995, with prices fixed at low levels, based on
estimated production costs
102.  
Also in Tajikistan, the government continues to be heavily involved in the cotton chain. Cotton gins 
are jointly owned by the government and so-called “investors” which are financial institutions with 
(informal) links to the government. Gins operate as monopolists in clearly delineated areas, and 
prevent farms from delivering to other gins. The “investors” provide crop finance and sales contracts 
to the farms, and control also the processing of the cotton. This monopolized system leads to rent 
extraction from farmers with low seed cotton prices and inflated input. No alternatives are available to 
cotton producers. 
The situation is entirely different in Kazakhstan, where interlinked contracting is also widespread in
cotton production, but where both producers and processors have been freed from government control 
since a few years. Gins were fully privatized by 1998 and, since then, many new gins have been 
established. The resulting competition and reduced transport costs have benefited (small) farms. Gins 
provide crop finance, as well as inputs, irrigation (water) and some agricultural services (Figure 4).
Large penalties have prevented opportunistic behaviour by farmers, as the perceived loss clearly 
exceeds the potential gains from side-selling. In case of default, a farmer has to repay his outstanding 
debts, incurs a penalty of 15% of the value of seed cotton not delivered under the contract and an 
increase in the cost of finance from 18% to 35%
103.
The situation in Kyrgyzstan is more complex. Privatization, removal of government control, and 
competition seem to have induced a rapid expansion of the Kyrgyz cotton sector, albeit from a very 
small base, with similar effects as in Kazakhstan for farms. Cotton production and processing continue
to expand strongly, partly based on smuggled Uzbek cotton, induced by the large price gap for seed 
cotton between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Many new gins have been constructed in recent years. 
Locally produced cotton is based on pre-finance contracts by the gins. However, a poor supporting 
102 For the past two years, however, important reforms have been taking place. Input provisions are being privatized, and 
fever restrictions are being imposed on finance.
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infrastructure and contract breaches with international traders a few years ago have negatively affected 
the growth of the cotton chain and contracting. Fund provision by international traders to ginneries has 
largely ceased. As a result, ginners have to provide financing out of their own cash reserves and this
hampers their ability to finance large amounts of seed cotton.  
In summary, two important effects of competition can be distinguished from this study of the Central 
Asian cotton sector. First, competition induced the spread of assistance programs throughout the 
sector. If one processor introduces an assistance program, other processors are forced to introduce 
similar supplier assistance programs. Suppliers may not want to deliver unless they get similar 
conditions. This finding confirms our general conclusion that competition is a key factor for 
encouraging innovation and productivity and that technological development is primarily encouraged 
through the presence of competition
104.
Second, competition prevents farmers from being “exploited” and allows farmers to get better 
conditions by improving their outside option. The only places where we find clear evidence that 
farmers are consistently exploited are in government-controlled monopolized systems, such as the 
cotton system in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan (and Turkmenistan). In contrast, in Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan, the cotton chain is characterized by strong competition among private gins buying cotton 
seeds from small farms for processing, with much better conditions for farmers. Table 1 illustrates that 
prices for Kazakh cotton farmers are two to three times higher than those in Uzbekistan or Tajikistan, 
where competition does not exist. 
While there remain important problems in the Kazakh and Kyrgyz cotton systems, compared with the 
situation in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, their situation seems to be considerably more favourable in 
terms of both equity and efficiency. Hence, competition plays a very important role in the cotton 
supply chains by inducing both beneficial equity and efficiency effects.  
Competition undermines input and credit program enforcement 
However, there is also considerable evidence that competition undermines the sustainability of input 
and credit programs. For example, in Chile, credit provision programs from traders in traditional small 
farmer crops like wheat, maize and beans have been given up, because of the numerous alternative 
marketing channels for these crops and the concomitant frequency of opportunistic sales by suppliers 
(Conning, 2000).  
In Kenya’s horticultural sector, companies without a dominant market share are subject to vigorous 
side-selling (Ruotsi, 2003). Frigoken, a French bean exporter, loses around 20% of its production to its 
competitors. Honey Care Africa, a fair trade honey exporter and Kenya Nut Ltd, a cashew and 
macadamia nut processor, closed down their credit provision programs because of the losses due to 
“pirate sales”.  
In the Zambian paprika sector, Cheetah Zambia reports that approximately 30-40% of total production 
ends up at its competitors (Ruotsi, 2003). Omnia Ltd, a leading fertilizer producer and manufacturer in
Zambia, closed down its credit scheme as well due to serious credit losses. The main reason for non-
repayment appeared that smallholders did not expect the company to take serious action against 
defaulters. 
Moreover, while the liberalization process in Asia and Africa improved prices for farms, it also 
undermined some of the traditional input supply systems. For example, in the Tanzanian cotton sector, 
inputs became more expensive and less available as they were no longer provided by the Cotton 
Board. In fact, both input and credit provision collapsed. In fact, some authors argue that the main 
reason why input and credit supply chain programs are still functioning in some countries is because 
of the limited competition, due to state intervention. The evidence on this is mostly limited to the 
cotton sector (see also Poulton et al., 2004).  
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In the Zimbabwean cotton sector, input credit provision remains viable, thanks to limited competition.
There are only three major players: Cottco, the former parastatal, who continues to assume price 
leadership, Cargill, the US multinational, and Cotpro, in which Cottco has a 60% stake, and the 
remaining 40% is French. Cottco’s loan recovery rate amounts up to 98%. Cottco and Cotpro are 
providing input credit. Suppliers deliver the contracted amounts to Cottco and Cotpro; the production 
surplus is sold to Cargill at more attractive rates. Up to now, input provision has remained viable, but 
competition is intensifying in the sector: Cottco’s market share decreased from 79% (2000) to 58% 
(2004). At the same time, the producer share of the export price increased to 78% over the same period
(Hanyani-Mlambo et al., 2005) 
A high degree of concentration remained after liberalization in the Zambian cotton sector as well: two
dominant cotton ginneries, Dunavant and Clark Cotton, hold together a market share of 80-90% in the 
cotton sector. Dunavant’s recovery rate for its input credit programs was around 85% in 2001.  
Mozambican cotton companies work under government-allocated land concessions, forging local 
monopoly conditions (Boughton et al., 2003; Ruotsi, 2003). Cotton companies in Mozambique are 
obliged to provide input credit to all producers. Foreign owned firms purchasing tobacco and maize 
from small farmers also benefit from such concessions. Companies without monopolistic concessions 
do not provide input credit, as this is perceived as unsustainable. The other side of the picture is that 
Mozambican producer price shares for cotton are the lowest in the region: under 40% of the export 
price.  
MAKING INTERLINKING SUSTAINABLE UNDER COMPETITION 
Our analysis shows that farms benefit from price competition between buyers. More competition leads 
to more equal rent sharing. But if competition gets too vigorous in the interlinked input and credit 
market, coordination may break down, and farmers may undermine their own productivity through 
strategic defaulting.  
Fortunately, there is evidence that institutional arrangements can prevent, or at least mitigate the 
sustainability problems of input programs in a competitive environment. This way, perverse effects of 
buyer competition are circumvented, such that competition can lead to higher efficiency and more 
equitable rent sharing.  
A first and obvious strategy to avoid side-selling, is to offer reliable and attractive contract terms. In 
Zimbabwe, incentive premiums are awarded to loyal farmers by Cottco and Cotpro, while defaulting 
farmers are effectively penalized (Larsen, 2002).  
A second strategy is to build an informal, personal relationship between buyer and supplier: frequent 
monitoring and field contact appears to contribute substantially to the reduction of pirate sales as well. 
Intensive monitoring is an important element of the high-value interlinked vegetable chains in 
Madagascar (Minten et al., 2006) 
Buyers can coordinate in order to avoid strategic default by suppliers. Conning (2000) cites an 
example from the fruit export sector in Chile, where lenders in fairly competitive environments create
informal cartel-like arrangements to exchange information about their borrowers and to avoid side-
selling. In Uganda, ginners and exporters have formed an association (UGEA) with compulsory 
membership of all cotton ginners (Gordon, 2000). Credit is provided by a parastatal, the Cotton 
Development Organization. Ginners are responsible for credit repayment, based on levies charged to 
the suppliers. Suppliers are free to sell their cotton to any ginner, as they are all paying the same prices 
and charging the same levies. Meanwhile, farmers’ share in world prices rose from below 50% to 70% 
in the period 1995/96 to 2003/04. A similar strategy is applied in Benin, where the CSPR (Centrale de 
Sécurisation des Paiements et des Recouvrements) was established in 2000 to insure recovery of input 
credit and producer payment without delay (Goreux and Macrae, 2003). Since many ginneries are 
operating below capacity, the CSPR allocates quota to each ginnery in terms how the maximum 
amount of seed cotton they are allowed to buy. The system appears to work, but meanwhile, it remains 
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However, such coordination may also lead to collusion, with undesirable effects. For example, in 
Ghana, following liberalization, private cotton companies colluded with respect to prices, such that 
suppliers were offered relatively low producer prices, but there was no coordination in the interlinked
credit market (Poulton, 1998). Incidental side-selling resulted in low credit recovery. To make things
worse, the Ministry of Agriculture was then urged to implement a local monopoly system, where each 
company was allowed the exclusive right of purchasing cotton in a certain zone. Similar developments 
occurred in Tajikistan (see above). These actions contribute to rent extraction, instead of alleviating it.  
Another way of avoiding side-selling to competing buyers is to reinforce reputation effects. By 
making information on opportunistic behaviour publicly available, reputation losses can be severe, and
violation of agreements is strongly discouraged. This mechanism is not restricted to developing 
countries; Bernstein (2001) describes the US cotton industry, where buyers’ associations are 
deliberately making reputation-related information available. Members who do not comply with the 
rules of the association, may be suspended or expelled, and will have their names publicized. The 
profitability of their future business will be seriously affected this way. In Pakistan, some farmers 
clearly have a stronger bargaining position at harvest time than at the time the interlinked contract is 
originally negotiated – but a farmer that depends on the same lender for credit the following season 
would not exploit this advantage (Stockbridge et al., 1998). The threat of withdrawing future access to
credit and especially publicly labelling the offending party as “a defaulter” is the lender’s main 
instrument in the enforcement of loan repayments. 
In Kenya, side-selling of part of the harvest to competitors at more attractive prices was avoided by 
conditioning future credit limits on past sales records (Jayne et al. 2004). This system also discourages 
suppliers to divert received fertilizer and chemicals to other crops.  
A final example is to use alternative, informal mechanisms of contract enforcement. For example, in 
Zimbabwe, as noted above, input provision by Cottco and Cotpro remains viable, in spite of side-
selling to Cargill (Larsen, 2002). Apart from other techniques formerly mentioned, microfinance 
group lending techniques are applied, similar to the Grameen banking principle as described by 
Stiglitz (1990). Interlinked contracts are assigned to groups of 5-30 suppliers. If one of them defaults, 
the whole group is penalized. In this way, local information is used in the process of self-selection of 
supplier groups. Other strategies based on peer monitoring were adapted by Pakistani agricultural 
traders (Smith et al., 1999). New suppliers of cotton need to put forward a “guarantor” in order to be 
eligible for input credit provision. In Tanzania (Poulton, 1998), “Local Information Networks” were 
addressed to intermediate in supplier selection for input provision programs. This way, a supplier’s 
reputation is used as “social collateral” to obtain a loan: an elegant way to overcome capital 
constraints. Information sharing may allow suppliers to benefit from competition between traders, 
whilst still having access to credit, as the risk of default by suppliers is reduced. According to 
Stockbridge et al. (1998), the effectiveness of such informal information exchange is partly a function 
of culture, but also depends on the available local transport and telecommunication infrastructure. An
example may be the concentration of businesses of the same trade in one street or location, facilitating 
information exchange between traders. 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS  
Vertical coordination in agrifood supply chains plays an important role in overcoming market 
imperfections in transition and developing countries. Processing, marketing and input supplying 
companies have engaged in different types of contracts with farms. Processors engaged in input 
provision in order to secure their supply, while input supplying firms engaged in output marketing, in
order to increase their sales volume and ensure repayment of provided credit. This system of 
“interlinking markets” has the potential to bring farm investment and production closer to their 
optimal levels. 
This paper analyzes the equity and efficiency effects of interlinking in supply chains, and the impact
of competition upon those. By introducing an interlinked contract, farms can access credit, inputs etc.
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supplies. Total welfare increases. It is not sure, however, that both parties gain from this transaction.
That depends, amongst other factors, on the availability of supply, the degree of competition between 
firms, and both parties’ relative bargaining strength. 
Empirical evidence reveals that competition has positive equity effects, but may have either positive or 
negative efficiency effects. In general, farmers benefit from competition between processing firms. 
More competition leads to more equal rent sharing, reflected in higher producer prices. More 
competition can also lead to competition on the services processing firms provide to farmers. As a 
result, farm assistance programs may become widespread, resulting in positive efficiency effects. But 
if competition becomes too vigorous in the interlinked input and credit market, coordination may 
break down. Farmers may undermine their own long run productivity through strategic defaulting in 
the short run. Many case studies report of input programs that collapsed due to competition, proving 
empirical support of negative efficiency effects of competition. In other cases, input programs 
remained sustainable under competition as a result of special institutional arrangements like frequent
monitoring, buyer coordination, or local information networks. Contracting, Competition and Rent Distribution in Commodity Value Chains  238
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Table 1: Variations in Central Asian Cotton Production, 1992 – 2003
105
Measure  Kazakhstan  Kyrgyzstan  Uzbekistan  Tajikistan 
Annual Growth Rate 
Harvested Area (Ha) 
1993 – 1998  12.3  6.0  -1.7  3.7 
1993 - 2003  5.8  7.6  -1.7  -0.1 
Seed Cotton Production (1000 MTs) 
1993 – 1998  26.7  11  -2.3  8.4 
1993 - 2003  8.9  11.5  -2.8  0.1 
Baled Cotton Production (1000 MTs) 
1993 – 1998  12.6  20.4  -2.7  0.4 
1993 - 2003  5.4  25.9  -2.6  -3.5 
Seed Cotton  
Price per MT, 2003  $550.00 $450.00  $200.00  $165.00 
Source: Swinnen et al., 2006 
Figure 1: Possible effects of interlinking on efficiency and equity 
105 There are significant differences in seed cotton production and baled cotton production. The most important reason for 
these differences is probably smuggling of seed cotton from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, 
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Figure 2: Bargaining power and the utility distribution 
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Figure 4: Share of farmers receiving specific farm assistance from cotton gins in 
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